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Abstract:
As recent incidents in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and other natural and man-made
disasters have illustrated, the moral content of looting spans an extraordinarily wide continuum:
At one end are predatory and exploitative acts that seem deserving of even greater punishment
than ordinary acts of burglary and larceny. At the other end are cases of necessity, involving
otherwise law-abiding citizens who, as a result of forces beyond their control, find themselves
hungry and exposed to the elements. In between these two poles lies a wide range of conduct
that often involves impoverished and alienated citizens living on the edges of society,
encouraged to engage in lawlessness by powerful group dynamics and the apparent suspension
of civil order.
This article begins by examining the various meanings – both literal and metaphorical –
of looting. It then considers the factors that make “bad looting” so bad, and “good looting” less
so. With respect to the latter, it considers the possibility that: (1) the disruption in normal social
order might leave defendants in a “state of nature,” outside the jurisdictional reach of the court;
(2) the defendant’s criminal acts were “necessary” in order to avoid some greater harm from
occurring; and (3) the otherwise law-abiding offender, suffering from a combination of fright,
fatigue, hunger, exposure, and disorientation, should be at least partially excused on the grounds
that his acts were “out of character.”
The article concludes by considering some of the practical implications of the foregoing
analysis, including the suggestion by various “conservative” commentators that the proper
response to looters is to “shoot them on sight.” It argues that such a policy would be profoundly
misguided, both because the criminal law should not tolerate the disproportionate use of deadly
force in response to what is essentially a property crime, and because of the obvious difficulties
of distinguishing between bad and good looting, particularly under the kinds of emergency
conditions in which such acts are committed.
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Of the countless images of chaos and turmoil that appeared in the media and on the
Internet in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, two particular photographs, juxtaposed, stand out:
In one of the images, shot by Dave Martin of the Associated Press, a young, dark-skinned man is
shown wading through chest-deep waters carrying a full garbage bag and what looks like a case
of soda. In the second picture, taken by Chris Graythen of AFP/Getty Images, a light-skinned
man and woman are shown, also wading through chest-deep water, also dragging goods behind
them.1
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What is notable about the photographs is not so much the images themselves, but the
captions that accompany them. The caption under the Martin photo says that the (dark-skinned)
man had been “looting a grocery store in New Orleans,” while the caption under the Graythen
photo says that the (light-skinned) pair had been “finding bread and soda from [sic] a local
grocery store.” What is perplexing about these captions is that, based solely on the evidence of
the photos, the acts depicted are, in legally relevant ways, virtually indistinguishable.
At least two possible explanations for this discrepancy come to mind. The most
straightforward one is that whoever wrote the captions possessed information not immediately
evident from the photos themselves. For example, it’s possible that the man in the Martin photo
had previously been observed stealing items from a store. Similarly, it’s possible that the pair in
the Graythen photo had spoken to the photographer and explained their plight. A very different
sort of explanation – much discussed on Internet blog sites – was that the captions reflect a racist
double standard, according to which young black men are presumed to be criminally inclined
while young whites are not.2 In the larger context of Hurricane Katrina and the shocking
ineptness of the governmental response to it – which left a disproportionate number of AfricanAmerican residents of New Orleans abandoned, homeless, and even dead – this explanation has
an undeniable resonance.
My interest in these photos lies elsewhere, however. As I shall discuss, the photos and
their captions are symptomatic of a broader moral indeterminacy that underlies the act of looting
itself. Indeed, as we shall see, looting constitutes a uniquely complex crime type. Its moral
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content spans an extraordinarily wide continuum: At one end are those heinous cases that seem
deserving of even greater punishment than ordinary acts of burglary and larceny -- cases
involving urban predators, perhaps already pursuing a life of crime, who use the occasion of a
natural disaster or civil unrest to exploit their neighbors at the hour of their greatest vulnerability,
carting away goods of types and quantities they could hardly begin to use for themselves, which
they plan to sell for a quick profit. At the other end of the continuum are those cases of pure
necessity, involving otherwise law-abiding citizens who, as a result of forces beyond their
control, find themselves and their families hungry, exposed to the elements, perhaps without
needed medicines, forced to break into a grocery store or pharmacy and take only enough to last
until the emergency is likely to end. In between these two poles lies a wide range of conduct that
often involves impoverished and alienated citizens living on the edges of society, who are
encouraged by powerful group dynamics and the apparent suspension of civil order to steal
property from what are often heavily insured businesses owned by anonymous shareholders and
managed by executives in far-off cities.
*

*

*

My aim in this article is to explore the moral and legal principles that inform the act of
looting, and to think more generally about the role of law in times of lawlessness. The occasion
for this exploration seems particularly ripe. Although looting of one sort or another has occurred
since virtually the beginning of recorded history, it seems to have become more common, or at
least more visible, in recent years. Since the turn of the 21st century, dramatic outbreaks of
looting have occurred not only in New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina; but also in the
Kashmir region of Pakistan, following the devastating earthquake there; in Indonesia, in the
wake of the tsunami; in Mexico and Cuba, following Hurricane Wilma; in France, during riots
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by angry youths; and even in New York City, after the attacks of September 11th.3 Indeed, it
now seems practically inevitable that, whenever terrible disaster strikes, looting will follow.
Yet, curiously, the subject of looting has received relatively little attention from scholars,
or from legislatures. The social, demographic, and psychological dynamics of looting have been
explored by social scientists in a number of studies,4 but looting as a distinct criminal act has
been almost completely ignored in the academic law literature.5 And while looting has been
treated as a war crime under international law since the early 1900s,6 only eight states have
enacted generalized looting statutes that apply outside the specifically military context, and these
statutes are almost never used.7
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My analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I seeks to define the meanings – both literal and
metaphorical -- of the term looting. It considers looting not only in the realm of natural disasters,
blackouts, and civil unrest, but also in the context of warfare, the removal of cultural objects, and
stealing from corporate and governmental treasuries. An attempt is made to identify the
paradigmatic features of looting, while recognizing that the term is also properly used for cases
that do not quite fit the paradigm. Looting is viewed as a species of the genus of theft, which is
typically characterized by unauthorized entry, misappropriation of property, and, often,
concerted action. What distinguishes looting from other forms of theft is a lack of normal
security brought on by emergency circumstances, resulting in the unusual vulnerability of its
victims and a general loss of social order.
Part II considers the differences between what I call “bad” and “good” looting, and what
lies in between. It begins by exploring the nature of bad looting, arguing that such acts, because
of their distinctive exploitative and predatory character, constitute a more serious crime than
simple burglary or theft. It then considers three possible grounds for mitigation, or even
exoneration, in at least some good, or at least “less bad,” cases of looting. The first is that the
disruption in normal social order left the defendant in a “state of nature,” outside the
jurisdictional reach of the court. The second is that the defendant’s criminal acts were
“necessary” in order to avoid some greater harm from occurring. The third is that the otherwise
law-abiding offender, suffering from a combination of fright, fatigue, hunger, exposure, and
disorientation, committed his acts, “out of character,” under the influence of poverty, alienation,
and powerful group dynamics.
Part III explores some of the practical implications of the foregoing analysis. It begins by
arguing that looting is so complex and multi-faceted a crime that principles of fair labeling and
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accurate classification demand a specialized statute. It then argues that such statutes need to
contain a method for grading acts of looting according to their seriousness, subjecting some,
particularly bad cases of looting to enhanced penalties, and allowing other, relatively good acts
of looting to be exonerated, or at least mitigated. Finally, it considers the appropriate law
enforcement response to looting. Various media commentators, such as Peggy Noonan, writing
on the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal,8 have suggested that the proper response to looters
is to “shoot them on sight.” Shooting looters seems also to have been, at least for a time, the
official policy of American occupation forces in Iraq.9 I argue that such a policy is profoundly
misguided, for at least two reasons. First, the criminal law should not tolerate the
disproportionate use of deadly force in response to what is essentially a property crime. Second,
the obvious difficulty of distinguishing between bad and good looting, particularly under the
kinds of emergency conditions in which, by definition, such acts occur, suggests that a policy of
shooting looters raises a serious danger of overdeterrence, of racial discrimination, and of
unnecessary killing.

I. The Concept of Looting
We begin our inquiry into the meaning of looting by examining the multiple contexts in
which the term is applied – to the taking of property in the wake of a natural disasters, blackouts,
and civil disturbances, as well as to stealing by soldiers and civilians in the midst of war, to the
so-called looting of antiquities and other cultural objects, and to the plundering of assets from
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corporate and governmental treasuries. We then turn to a more detailed look at the basic
elements – both legal and moral – of looting in the wake of disasters and civil unrest, which will
be our main focus throughout.
Before we can begin our discussion of the meaning of looting, there is one preliminary
point that needs to be addressed. To say that D has “looted” is ordinarily to make a negative
normative judgment about D’s behavior. From a linguistic standpoint, there is no such thing as
looting that is not bad. When acts that would otherwise constitute looting are justified or
excused, we would not ordinarily refer to them as “looting.” Instead, we would probably say
that D had “carried away” or “scavenged” or “foraged” or “found.” Indeed, it is just this
linguistic fact that explains what it was that made the captioning of the Martin and Graythen
photos so controversial.
Nevertheless, in the interest of linguistic efficiency, I shall for present purposes use the
term looting in a somewhat artificial, non-pejorative, morally neutral sense. That is, I shall use
“looting” to refer to the carrying away of goods belonging to another in a time of natural disaster
or civic unrest regardless of whether such carrying away is ultimately determined to be lawful or
justified. Hence, the possibility of what I shall refer to somewhat idiosyncratically as “good”
looting.

A. Defining “Looting”
Although our main focus will be looting in the wake of disasters, it will be useful, at this
preliminary stage, to survey how the term is used in other contexts as well, if only to see if there
is some common quality or set of qualities that underlies all of these uses, and thereby sheds light
on what it is that makes looting a morally distinctive act. For a start, we can identify at least
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three senses (other than stealing in the wake of a disaster) in which the term looting has been
used.

1. Looting as an act of warfare
Historically, the earliest context in which looting is said to have occurred is the military
one. The word looting derives via the Hindi lut from the Sanskrit lunt, meaning “to rob.”10 The
term originally referred to the taking of goods by victorious troops, or sometimes by citizens,
during or immediately following warfare, when defeated armies and populations were at their
most vulnerable.
Interestingly, looting in this sense was not uniformly viewed as criminal or deviant.
Presumably it was viewed as such by those who had their possessions taken. In the eyes of the
law, however, looting was viewed as a prerogative, a legitimate form of compensation for
otherwise poorly paid soldiers, a bona fide “spoil of war” to which the victors were entitled.11
There was a complex system of rules that governed the taking of loot, including rules about the
kinds of buildings that could be entered, the kinds of goods that could be taken, the kinds of
person affected (soldiers or civilians), and the time frame within which such takings could
occur.12 It is important to note, however, that such approval of looting applied only in the
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military context. As Justinian makes clear, looting in the case of civil disaster was prohibited
even under Roman law.13
Under contemporary international law, however, looting (or “pillage,” as it is usually
termed) is uniformly prohibited. The Hague Convention of 190714 and the Geneva Convention
of 194915 make it a crime to take or destroy real or personal property during an occupation unless
it is “absolutely necessary.”16 Unfortunately, international law offers no explicit definition of
“looting” or “pillage.” Instead, it says simply that such provisions are “designed to spare people
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the suffering resulting from the destruction of their real and personal property (houses, deeds,
bonds, etc., furniture, clothing, provisions, tools, etc.).”17

2. Removal of cultural objects and natural resources
Another, related, but somewhat narrower use of the term looting is to refer to the removal
of culturally or archaeologically significant objects (as well as precious minerals and other
natural resources) from native sites. Although no bright line can be drawn between this kind of
looting and the more general form of looting described above, this sort of looting is worth
distinguishing, since it is specifically prohibited by the 1954 Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.18 Moreover, from a definitional
standpoint, this kind of looting is unique. It is the only form of looting the definition of which
takes account of the particular kind of things stolen, in addition to the circumstances in which
such stealing occurs.
In recent years, the most notorious case of such looting is that which occurred in the
wake of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. As American troops entered Baghdad on April
9, Iraqi looters began ransacking government buildings, stores, mosques, and private homes,
stealing what they could find and defacing symbols of Saddam Hussein’s regime.19 Among the
most dramatic acts of looting were those committed at the Iraqi National Museum. As American
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troops stood by, largely idle, rampaging mobs carted off thousands of artifacts from one of the
world’s great collections of Babylonian, Sumerian, and Assyrian antiquities.20

3. Looting as corruption
A third way in which the term looting is used is in the context of corporate and white
collar crime. Executives are said to have looted corporate bank accounts. Government officials
are accused of looting national treasuries or the social security trust fund. A particularly
notorious example is the so-called looting of savings and loan institutions that was perpetrated
during the 1980s by figures such as Charles Keating.21
Looting of this sort differs from the other forms of looting we have been looking at in at
least two ways. First, unlike the other forms of looting, this kind of looting does not necessarily
involve the physical taking of tangible property. One can loot a business’s treasury, for example,
on-line, by diverting corporate assets into one’s own bank accounts. Second, whereas looting in
the more conventional sense involves victims made vulnerable by natural disaster, war, or
political instability, looting in the white collar sense involves victims who are exploited by a
person who occupies a position of trust, usually a government official or corporate insider.22
Given these differences, it may make sense to understand the white collar sense of the term
looting as less literal than metaphorical.
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B. Looting in the Wake of Natural Disasters and Civil Disturbances
Having looked at looting in the context of warfare, cultural objects, and corruption, we
can now turn to our main focus of interest – looting in the wake of a natural disaster or civil
unrest. In seeking the paradigmatic features of such criminality, the most obvious place to look
is to statutory law. Somewhat surprisingly, however, only seven U.S. states currently have a
distinct, generally applicable crime of looting, and, as I shall now discuss, those statutes fail to
capture the full sense of what makes looting a distinctive crime.
The states with civilian looting statutes are California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina.23 Such statutes typically impose penalties that
are greater than those for ordinary burglary and theft, and in some cases require restitution and
community service.24 Twenty-seven states and Guam also have anti-looting provisions that
apply specifically to their national guard troops.25 Looting is also a distinct offense in a number
of other countries as well, including Argentina, France, and Israel.26 I will have more to say
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below about whether there is a need for a specialized looting statute. For the moment, I shall
simply note that in states without specialized looting statutes, the act is typically prosecuted as a
form of aggravated theft or larceny. And even in those states that do have specialized looting
provisions, such statutes are rarely, if ever, used. Indeed, it is striking that such statutes seem to
have resulted in not a single reported case of prosecution.27
The statutes typically require that, in order to commit looting, the defendant must: (1)
make an unauthorized entry into a home or business; (2) in which normal security of property is
not present by virtue of some natural disaster or civil disturbance (and in which potential victims
are therefore made more vulnerable); and (3) thereby obtain control over, damage, or remove the
property of another. It is worth asking both the extent to which each of these elements should be
regarded as essential to our conception of looting, and whether there are additional
characteristics that should be included as well. As I will suggest, a fuller account of looting
would also consider: (4) the collective character of much looting. Let us consider each element
in turn.

1. Unauthorized entry into home or business
Looting statutes typically require that the perpetrator make an unlawful entry into a home
or business, or other unlawful trespass onto premises, before committing some additional
criminal act (usually taking, damaging, destroying, or exerting control over some property). In
American statutory law, therefore, looting requires not just the taking of or damaging property
(in conditions of emergency), but also an unlawful entry prior to such taking.
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For some speculation as to why there are both so few looting statutes and so few prosecutions under such
statutes, see Scott, supra note 5, at 156-57.

14

We need to ask, however, whether the concept of looting should necessarily entail an
unauthorized entry or trespass. One can easily imagine a case in which an offender, in the
aftermath of a storm or earthquake, takes the property of another without making an unlawful
entry. For example, she might steal valuable items from the corpses of earthquake victims, or
from the ruins of a burned-out building (where entry might not necessarily constitute trespass),
or from a relief agency’s cache of supplies kept temporarily in open air. Such acts would seem
to satisfy the common sense conception of looting, even if they did not satisfy its statutory
requirements. So, at least with respect to the element of entry, the statutory definition of looting
is arguably too narrow.

2. Stealing and other post-entry acts against property rights
Looting involves more than simply unlawful entry into another’s property. The looter
must also commit some additional criminal act once inside. But the question is what that
additional act should be. The statutes typically require that, in addition to making an unlawful
entry, the offender also “take,” “obtain,” “exert control over,” “damage,” or “destroy” another’s
“property.” It is worth asking whether the concept of looting should also include cases in which
an intruder enters a home or business in which normal security is not present and commits a rape
or murder, rather than a theft or destruction of property.
As a linguistic matter, it seems problematic to say that one who enters a home or business
to commit a rape or murder or other violent offense is “looting.” The term loot, like the terms
pillage, rapine, and sack has always been associated with the taking of goods. As serious a
crime as looting undoubtedly is, it would seem odd to use the term looter to refer someone who
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commits the more serious offense of rape or murder. Certainly, rape and murder lack the moral
ambiguity that, I am arguing, is characteristic of looting.
Assuming that I am correct, and that the looter must commit some property crime once
inside, there is an additional question whether it is sufficient for the looter to borrow or vandalize
or destroy such property, rather than steal it. Once again, language and etymology are helpful
here. The noun loot clearly connotes the idea that goods or money have been taken.28 It would
seem strange to refer to as “loot” property that has been merely damaged, borrowed, or
destroyed. Thus, we might think that, with respect to this element, the statutes define looting too
broadly.
Indeed, it may be helpful to think of looting as, essentially, a particular form of theft.
The term theft refers not to the unlawful borrowing or destruction of property (we use the terms
joyriding and vandalism, respectively, to refer to those acts), but rather to its complete
misappropriation. At common law, theft could be committed in a variety of ways: by stealth
(larceny), deception (false pretenses), coercion (extortion), breach of trust (embezzlement), and
so on. To be sure, the modern trend towards consolidation, exemplified most famously by
Section 223.1 of the Model Penal Code, has blurred important moral distinctions that such
differentiation traditionally reflected.29 For the moment, however, my argument is simply that
looting involves the unlawful misappropriation of property in a way that is morally
distinguishable from all of the other ways of unlawfully misappropriating property, and that
looting therefore ought to be treated as a separate and distinct offense -- we can think of it as a
28
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kind of “theft in circumstances of emergency” -- rather than merely as a subtype of larceny or
burglary.

3. Group criminality
In what appears to be the only previous extended discussion of the law of looting, Roger
Scott argues that one of the key elements of the offense is its collective or group character.30
While Scott concedes that “[n]ot all looting is committed by multiple perpetrators” (and indeed
none of the looting statutes actually requires concerted action), he nevertheless contends that “the
majority of incidents considered ‘looting’ are perpetrated by groups, from as few as a dozen
actors to as many as thousands.”31 Scott argues that looting is analogous to crimes such as
conspiracy and racketeering in that it poses the special kind of danger that is associated with
group criminality. This is one of the reasons, he says, that looting should be regarded as more
harmful and more culpable (and should therefore be subject to higher penalties) than other theftrelated crimes.32
There are two problems with Scott’s argument. First, he fails to recognize the distinction
that has been made in the social science literature between looting in the wake of natural
disasters and looting in the wake of civil disturbances. As studies by researchers such as E.L.
Quarantelli and Russell Dynes suggest, it is only the latter form of looting that is typically
perpetrated in groups; looting in the wake of natural disorders is usually done alone.33 Second,
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Scott, supra note 5, at 147-52.
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Id. at 152.
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Id. at 150.
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Quarantelli & Dynes, supra note 4. There are other differences as well. First, looting in civil disturbances tends
to be more widespread than looting in the wake of natural disasters in the sense that it involves a broader segment of
the population in terms of age and socio-economic status. Second, looting in natural disasters is committed by
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his analysis seems mistaken even with respect to civil disturbance looting. To be sure, such
looting does reflect a complex social dynamic: For example, according to various accounts of the
New York City blackout of 1977, the first wave of looting was conducted by professional
criminals who broke into stores within minutes of the blackout and took the most desirable
merchandise; the second wave consisted of alienated youths and poor, unemployed young adults;
and the final wave, occurring several hours after the blackout began, involved “‘stable poor and
working class members of the community who were caught up in the near hysteria of the
streets.’”34 But to say that civil disorder looting reflects an aggregative, “everyone-else-isdoing-it” quality is only to say that it frequently occurs in groups, not that it is necessarily
committed by groups. The difference lies in the fact that civil disorder looting, unlike conspiracy
(which, by definition, requires an agreement), only rarely involves action that can properly be
characterized as coordinated.35

4. Absence of normal security of property
Looting statutes typically require that the offense be committed in circumstances “in
which normal security of property is not present.”36 Ordinarily, such lack of normal security is
the result of a “hurricane, flood, fire, act of God, or force majeure of any kind, or by virtue of a
people who live both inside and outside the community (including, sometimes, the security forces who are sent in to
prevent such behavior), whereas in civil disorders it is almost exclusively engaged in by local residents. Third,
looting in civil disturbances tends to be focused on retail stores, as opposed to offices, schools, private homes, and
factories, and such looters tend to be more “selective” with respect to the kinds of goods they steal than in the case
of natural disasters. Fourth, looting in civil disturbances tends to be committed much more open than in the case of
natural disasters; looters take goods in full view of others, bystanders, participants, and even police officers. Id. at
174.
34

Id. at 40 (quoting ROBERT CURVIN & BRUCE PORTER, BLACKOUT LOOTING! NEW YORK CITY, JULY 13, 1977
(1979) 6-7).
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riot, mob, or other human agency.” Even celebrations over sporting events have prompted large
scale riots and looting.37
It is ultimately the absence of normal security brought on by an emergency that
distinguishes looting from a range of “everyday” offenses such as burglary, theft, and
conspiracy, potentially removes it even from the realm of law itself, and contributes to its
bewildering moral complexity. In some cases, as we shall see, the emergency will make the
looter’s stealing a necessity, and thereby mitigate the wrongfulness of her act. In other cases, the
disaster will make the looter’s potential victims more vulnerable. Hurricanes and other disasters
cause the loss of power, lighting, telephone service, and burglar alarms. Walls and doors are
blown away or burned down; unusual demands are placed on police and other rescue personnel;
residents are forced to leave their property unattended to find safety elsewhere. Other things
being equal, therefore, victims whose property lacks normal security are likely to be more
vulnerable than victims whose property does not lack normal security. To the extent that looters
are aware of this fact,38 the wrongfulness of their act would be increased.

II. The Moral Content of Looting
Having looked at the various meanings of looting in Part I, we are now in a position to
untangle its complex moral content. The basic problem is as follows: Every act that might be
called looting involves the same basic elements: (1) an unauthorized entry, (2) the taking or
destruction of property, and (3) circumstances in which normal security of property is not present
37

See Rosenfeld, supra note 4.
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There is an interesting question whether an “ordinary burglar” who arrives in town after a natural disaster has hit
and is somehow unaware that security is less than usual would be guilty of looting. My instinct is that he would not
– that looting requires that the offender be aware that normal security is not present. My thanks to Antony Duff for
raising this point.
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by virtue of some natural disaster or civil disturbance. But not all of these acts are morally
equivalent. The question to be considered here is: how do we sort out those cases of looting that
are “bad” from those that are “good” and from those that are “in between”?

A. Bad Looting
What is it about looting that tends to evoke such a strongly negative emotional response?
Why is the term looting so often used pejoratively, to denote acts that are viewed as even more
culpable than ordinary theft? Why do some people believe that looters should be “shot on
sight”? The answer, I believe, is that those cases of looting that make the strongest impression
in the public’s consciousness, and are most publicized by the media, are precisely those that are
the most shocking and reprehensible.39 When the public thinks of looting, what it typically has
in mind are the most blameworthy of cases, in which bands of marauding youths crash through
the plate glass windows of local stores, carting away electronic equipment, liquor, and jewelry.
Such looters, it would seem, are motivated not by the urge to survive, but by greed and
opportunism.
Natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes often cause great loss and suffering in
their victims. The natural and healthy human response to those who are suffering is pity or
compassion. As events like Hurricane Katrina and those of September 11 illustrate, many people
respond to such suffering heroically.40 The bad looter has exactly the opposite reaction: At the
very moment when morality demands kindness and caring, even self-sacrifice, he responds with
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See Kathleen Tierney, et al., Metaphors Matter: Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their Consequences in
Hurricane Katrina, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. __ (2006).
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See, e.g., Havidán Rodríduez, et al., “Rising to the Challenges of a Catastrophe: The Emergent and Prosocial
Behavior following Hurricane Katrina,” 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. __ (2006).
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selfishness. He preys on and exploits the plight of his fellow human beings. At its worst, the
looter’s acts might be characterized as a form of cruelty, which has a claim to being the greatest
of all evils.41
Looting of this sort also causes fear and resentment in those who are exposed to it. The
looter strikes at just the moment when his neighbors are most in need. His actions are
accompanied by broken glass and bashed-in doors, even fire. The act is raw and committed
without shame, in the open. It aggravates the misery and anxiety that the triggering disaster has
already caused.
Further, the looter expresses a disregard for the law, an embrace of anarchy. Looting is
disturbing because it reminds us of the apparent fragility of our social contract. Beneath the thin
crust of civilization, it is said, “lurks a savage animal that will emerge under stress
circumstances.”42 Bad looting is the product of an inversion of moral norms in which what is
normally illicit becomes licit. Lawlessness is not only tolerated, but encouraged. Looting shakes
the confidence we feel in our social institutions, and, perhaps more generally, the faith we have
in our fellow human beings.

B. Looting in a “State of Nature”
Having considered the kind of looting that is deserving of even greater blame than
ordinary acts of theft and trespass, we now turn our attention to those circumstances that might
exempt looting from criminal punishment, or at least mitigate its wrongfulness. We begin with
the possibility that the circumstances in which much looting occurs – namely, major disasters
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For a stimulating argument to this effect, see JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 7-44 (1984).
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that leave citizens arguably beyond the scope of ordinary law and social norms – would make
charges of looting “non-justiciable.”
An argument of this sort first seems to have appeared in Lon Fuller’s famous fictitious
Case of the Speluncean Explorers.43 The case involves a group of spelunkers in the
Commonwealth of Newgarth, who are trapped in a cave by a landslide. As they approach the
point of starvation, they make radio contact with a rescue team. They are told that the rescue
will take another ten days and that, unless they obtain nourishment, they will surely die. With no
one at the rescue camp willing to advise them as to what they should do, the men turn off the
radio, hold a lottery, kill the loser (one Whetmore), eat his body, and survive. When they are
rescued, they are prosecuted for murder, which in Newgarth carries a mandatory death penalty.
The question, of course, is whether they should have a defense.
One of Fuller’s fictitious judges, Foster, J., argues as follows:
[P]ositive law is predicated on the possibility of men's coexistence in society. When a
situation arises in which the coexistence of men becomes impossible, then a condition
that underlies all of our precedents and statutes has ceased to exist. When that condition
disappears . . . the force of our positive law disappears with it. . . .
Had the tragic events of this case taken place a mile beyond the territorial limits
of our Commonwealth, no one would pretend that our law was applicable to them. We
recognize that jurisdiction rests on a territorial basis. . . . Now I contend that a case may
be removed morally from the force of a legal order, as well as geographically. If we look
to the purposes of law and government, and to the premises underlying our positive law,
these men when they made their fateful decision were as remote from our legal order as if
they had been a thousand miles beyond our boundaries. . . .
I conclude, therefore, that at the time Roger Whetmore's life was ended by these
defendants, they were, to use the quaint language of nineteenth-century writers, not in a
“state of civil society” but in a “state of nature.” This has the consequence that the law
applicable to them is not the enacted and established law of this Commonwealth, but the
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law derived from those principles that were appropriate to their condition. I have no
hesitancy in saying that under those principles they were guiltless of any crime.44
Note that the argument here is different from the usual justification or excuse defenses
(considered below), both of which operate within the parameters of the criminal law. Here, the
defendant is arguing not that he should win the case on its merits, but that the case is nonjusticiable, that it lies outside the competence of the court.
The crime that Fuller’s judge has in mind, of course, is murder. If Fuller’s argument
applies to the most serious of crimes, then we might think that it would apply a fortiori to the
lesser offense as theft. As Andrew von Hirsch puts it, “The criminal code of any civilized
country is written on the assumption that certain social institutions exist. A citizen should not
steal but avail himself of existing permissible means of earning his own living; he should not
commit assault but settle grievances through law, and so on.” 45 In the wake of extraordinary
situations like those brought on by hurricanes and earthquakes, the argument goes, the
institutions which the criminal law presupposes are absent and the law can no longer sensibly
apply. As von Hirsch argues, “[i]t makes no sense to try to compel people to behave like
civilized individuals when the minimum requirements of civilization are lacking.”46
There are, however, several problems with the argument from non-justiciability. First,
the state of nature, as traditionally conceived (most famously by Hobbes), refers to the
hypothetical condition of humanity before the state is established and positive law comes into
being.47 One who has already grown up in human society and had her behavior shaped by
44

Id.
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prevailing norms cannot then step outside of society just because she finds herself in the middle
of a hurricane.48 Society may ultimately decide that the defendant’s plight entitles her to special
consideration, including perhaps a defense to criminal charges, but that is very different from
saying that she is not subject to society’s laws and norms in the first place.
Second, the argument proves too much. As von Hirsch himself concedes, “[p]rosecution
would be dismissed not only for actions taken to save defendants’ own lives but for any other act
(however seemingly needless or barbaric) committed while the emergency existed.49 The fact
that the defendant’s act was unnecessary would be irrelevant. Thus, even a defendant who used
the occasion of an extreme emergency to commit a crime such as rape would be exempt from
criminal liability – an outcome that would seem morally unacceptable.
Nor, it seems, can the argument from non-justiciability be salvaged by contending not
that all law is temporarily suspended but only that the laws regarding the ownership of property
are suspended. An argument of this sort is offered by the sociologists Dynes and Quarantelli.50
It runs as follows: Our law of property presupposes a shared understanding about who can do
what with the valued resources of the community. When a devastating hurricane or earthquake
strikes, property rights are redefined. What was once the property of individuals becomes the
property of the community generally. With individual property rights suspended, they say,
“appropriation of private resources – which would normally be considered looting – is
temporarily condoned.”51
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This argument, although perhaps superficially appealing, suffers from the same kind of
defect as the more general argument from non-justiciability. Taken to its logical conclusion, it
would exempt from criminal liability not only the more sympathetic cases of “justified” or
“excused” acts of looting but also the most heinous acts of looting – those perpetrated by
professional criminals who themselves are in no distress but who use the occasion of a natural
disaster to prey on their fellow citizens. Assuming that we would want to hold “bad” looters of
this sort accountable for their acts, we need some more nuanced, fact-specific approach for
exempting “less bad” looters from criminal liability.

C. Necessity Defense
When a defendant argues that he was justified in committing some putatively criminal
act, he is arguing that even though he did in fact commit all of the requisite acts, he nonetheless
did nothing morally wrong. This is so because the crime’s definition of prohibited conduct is, in
a sense, incomplete.52 Contemporary law permits what the crime as-defined otherwise prohibits
where circumstances make his action the right (or at least not the wrong53) thing to do.54 As the
Model Penal Code Commentary puts it, “[a] speed limit may be violated in pursuing a suspected
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criminal. An ambulance may pass a traffic light. . . A druggist may dispense a drug without the
requisite prescription to alleviate grave distress in an emergency.”55 Sometimes the offense
provision itself will specify conditions in which the defendant’s act will be considered justified.56
More commonly, the defendant will have to rely on a generalized “necessity” or “choice of
evils” defense provision.
So are there cases in which a person who has engaged in conduct that satisfies the
statutory definition of looting would be entitled to a defense of necessity? Imagine a case in
which a person is stranded without food or water in the aftermath a hurricane or earthquake, with
no rescue in sight. He breaks into a grocery store and carries away enough food to survive for
several days. Under one conceptual frame, it seems clear that looting of this sort would be
justified. Indeed, the case is reminiscent of the classic Model Penal Code paradigm case, in
which a hiker, stranded in a snowstorm without food, breaks into another’s cabin to find shelter
and obtain sustenance.57 The looter has violated the prohibition against trespassing and theft, but
he has nonetheless done the right (or at least not the wrong) thing, since he has saved a life (his
own) by doing so, at a relatively low cost to the cabin’s owner (namely, the loss of food and
whatever minimal damage is caused to the window or door through which the looter entered).
But the calculation of evils prevented, and evils caused, is actually more complicated
than this simple account would suggest. The most direct harms caused by the offender’s looting
55
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are those suffered by the person or entity whose premises are looted. Less direct harms accrue to
the community generally -- the loss of civil order and the sense of fear that such loss is likely to
cause. We must also consider the possibility that looting tends to be contagious: others in the
community might be encouraged by the offender’s acts to engage in similar, perhaps less clearly
justified, conduct. And such looting might also cause more remote, but still significant harms:
for example, the store whose goods were looted might have its insurance premiums increased; as
a result, it might decide to raise its prices or even close for good; the premises might remain
vacant and boarded up; the incident might mark the beginning of the community’s slide into
decline.
One of the difficulties here is that comparing harms requires potentially difficult
normative judgments. It’s easy to see that, other things being equal, it should be permissible to
cause ten dollars in property damage in order to prevent a million dollars worth of such damage.
But by what yardstick are we to compare incommensurable evils, such as, on the one hand, the
hunger that is alleviated by the looter’s stealing food and, on the other, the disorder in the
community to which his looting might contribute?58 And such calculations are made even more
complicated by deontological constraints on certain forms of behavior.59 For example, even if,
in a straight-up comparison, we would always choose the minor loss of property over hunger and
possible starvation, our repugnance to stealing and social chaos might be such that we would
disapprove of such conduct even if hunger could be alleviated as a result.
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There are other factors as well that might complicate the analysis. We would want to
know not only the seriousness of the potential harm to the defendant, but also its probability. At
common law, the necessity defense traditionally required proof of imminence. The Model Penal
Code has eliminated this requirement, but some notion of probability nevertheless seems implicit
in the concept of “necessity.” In addition, the law of necessity has traditionally required both
that there be no legal means of averting the harm and that the offender have had no fault in
creating the necessitous situation. In the context of our looting hypothetical, we would thus want
to know the extent to which relief might have been “on the way,” and whether the offender
somehow contributed to his plight (for example, by failing to abide by a mandatory evacuation
order prior to the storm)
Much of the scholarly debate over the rationale for, and limits of, the necessity defense
has focused on those cases in which the crime committed to avoid some greater harm from
occurring is homicide. (In such cases, the defendant invariably kills a single victim in order to
avoid the deaths of multiple victims.60) But with respect to the lesser charges of trespass and
theft, scholars have more or less assumed that necessity will, in appropriate cases, provide a
complete defense.61 Indeed, as noted, the case of the lost and starving hiker who breaks into a
cabin in the wilderness to obtain food and other basic provisions is often viewed as the paradigm
case of necessity, the uncontested hypothetical that is given in the Model Penal Code
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Commentary and cited in hundreds of other discussions of the defense.62 To the extent that there
is any theoretical controversy here, it focuses primarily on the civil law question whether the
intruder should be obligated to pay the owner compensation.63
Curiously, however, reported cases in which a defendant, charged with theft or trespass,
was acquitted by virtue of the necessity defense are virtually nonexistent. Indeed, it is unusual
for the defense even to be offered. The vast majority of the necessity-as-a-defense-to-trespass
cases have involved what amounted to civil disobedience, where defendant protesters trespassed
in order to obstruct the operations of a nuclear plant or a government building, and where the
court typically held that the harm sought to be averted was insufficiently imminent or that legal
alternatives existed.64 Also rare are cases in which necessity was recognized as a defense to
theft. Even in those civil-disobedience-like-cases in which animal rights activists broke into a
laboratory and stole animals on which experiments were about to be conducted, the defense was
unsuccessful.65 Indeed, the case of Jean Valjean is doubly illustrative here. Victor Hugo’s story
of a man who steals a loaf of bread to feed his starving family is often cited as the paradigmatic
example of a crime committed out of necessity. But it is worth recalling that, like almost every
other case in which necessity has been asserted as a defense to charges of theft or trespass,
Valjean’s plea was unsuccessful.
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What accounts for this divergence between clear-cut theoretical acceptance and the realworld futility of necessity as a defense to theft?66 One possibility is that prosecutors are unlikely
to bring charges of theft when it is clear that the defendant’s acts were occasioned by grave
distress. Another, more far-reaching, explanation is that the case-by-case, seemingly ad hoc
nature of the necessity defense tends to cause “anxiety” among decision makers in the criminal
justice system by, as John Parry puts it, “undermin[ing] the consistency and predictability that
we often view as essential to the rule of law.”67
One solution to this morass would be to draft statutes that specifically contemplate the
circumstances in which the defense of necessity will be recognized. In other words, rather than
leaving the question of necessity to generalized, broadly worded, “anxiety”-producing “choice of
evils” provisions, where it is likely to be marginalized, we would do better to include provisions
in our theft and trespass statutes that specifically enumerate the possible circumstances in which
the defense of necessity might arise.

C. Excusing Looting
Having surveyed the moral content of looting at the two ends of the continuum, I now
want to focus on those cases of looting that are neither so blameworthy that they deserve
heightened punishment nor so justified that they should lead to exoneration. My interest here is
in the circumstances that might make the defendant’s conduct excused – whether completely or
only partially. (I should note that, in the discussion that follows, I make no clear distinction
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between complete and partial defenses; instead, I assume that the same kind of circumstances
can potentially justify both complete exoneration and mere mitigation.68)
Although the precise logic of excuse defenses is controversial, I shall for present
purposes subscribe to the view of excuses developed by Jeremy Horder. Under Horder’s view,
there are two kinds of conditions that must be satisfied in order for a claim of excuse in the
criminal law to be successful. The first kind of condition he calls “necessary.” According to
Horder:
[I]t is a necessary condition of any claim to excuse that it is an explanation for
engagement in wrongdoing (an explanation not best understood as a justification, as a
simple claim of involuntariness, or as an out-and-out denial of responsibility) that sheds
such a favourable moral light on D’s conduct that it seems entirely wrong to convict, at
least for the full offence. . . . Excuses excuse the act or omission amounting to
wrongdoing, by shedding favourable light on what D did through a focus on the reasons
that D committed that wrongdoing.69
In addition, according to Horder, even if the first condition is met, a court should deny an alleged
excuse unless a second, “sufficient” condition is also met. D’s explanation for wrongdoing will
not meet the sufficiency condition unless his case still seems compelling when the law’s
“strategic” goal of “maintain[ing] the integrity and flourishing of a common good” is taken into
account.70 For present purposes, I shall focus on the first kind of Horder’s conditions, while
recognizing that consideration of the second kind of condition could substantially affect the
ultimate outcome of a given case or category of cases.
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What is important to note is that excuse defenses function quite differently from
justification defenses like necessity. Whereas justification defenses consist of arguments that the
defendant’s conduct was not harmful or wrongful, excuse defenses focus on the culpability of the
actor himself. Thus, to say that a given act of looting is excused is not to say that the looter’s act
was not wrong (in the way that a justified act is not wrong), but rather to say that the looter
should not be held fully responsible for his conduct and should be exempt from punishment
entirely or should have his punishment mitigated.

1. The Case of the “Morally Ambiguous” Looter
In order to test the applicability of excuse in the context of looting, let us imagine the
case of what I shall call the “morally ambiguous” looter: L is a 25-year old African-American
male who has grown up and lives in a high crime section of New Orleans East. Although he
graduated from high school, his reading and writing skills are limited and the best job he has
been able to find is that of a sales clerk for the local Wal-Mart, where he earns the minimum
hourly wage of $5.15. He suffers from asthma but has no health insurance. With his weekly
salary of approximately $200, he is barely able to pay for food, clothing, and the rent on the tiny
apartment in which lives. He has no virtually savings. He owns no car. He spends several hours
a day watching television and finds himself highly susceptible to advertising. There are
numerous consumer products he would like to own, but cannot afford.
Although he grew up in New Orleans and still has family and friends there, L feels little
connection to the larger community in which he lives. He rarely votes in elections. The schools
that he attended were sub-standard. Trash pickup in his neighborhood is irregular. The roads are
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in disrepair. Gun shots can often be heard after dark. Drug dealers operate openly. In general, L
feels that the system has let him down.
When he was in high school, L was once arrested on a misdemeanor charge of marijuana
possession. The charge was subsequently dropped and since then L has avoided any
involvement in criminal activity. Indeed, he has made a conscious decision in his life to “stay
out of trouble.”
On August 29, a hurricane strikes New Orleans. Although voluntary evacuation orders
have been issued, L has not been able to find transportation out of town. L finds his
neighborhood in chaos. Levees are breached and flood waters rise. Bedlam breaks out. Gangs
of young men, including some whom L knows from the neighborhood, break into stores and
walk away with liquor, flat screen televisions, jewelry, and other luxury items. Some of L’s
acquaintances among the looters urge him to join them. Police are either nowhere to be seen or
are standing by doing nothing.
At no point is L without access to food, clean water, or other basic necessities needed to
survive. But he is tired, scared, and anxious. His world seems turned upside down. Looters are
breaking into stores and carrying out all the goods they can carry. It almost seems as if these
goods, which in normal circumstances are well beyond L’s limited purchasing power, are free for
the taking.
Acting against the settled law-abiding course that he has set for himself in life, L enters
into the melee and participates in the looting of an electronics store. He steals a stack of DVDs,
an IPod, and a laptop computer. The store from which L steals is fully insured. He is
subsequently arrested and charged with looting. The question is whether there might be an
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“explanation” for L’s conduct such that he might be entitled, if not to a full excuse, then at least
to a mitigation in his punishment.

2. The Excuse of Acting “Out of Character”
Traditionally, the law has maintained a relatively short list of available excuse defenses,
consisting of duress, mistake, involuntary intoxication, insanity, and provocation (the last of
which functions as a partial defense that mitigates murder to manslaughter). L’s situation does
not seem to qualify for any of these defenses. He has not been threatened with harm unless he
commits a crime, as the duress defense requires. He is not unable to distinguish between right
and wrong or to control his impulses, as the insanity defense requires. There is no evidence of
intoxication. Nor can L claim that he was actively misled into believing that his conduct was
legal.71 Nevertheless, I believe that at least a partial excuse defense might be worked out on the
grounds that L, in looting, acted “out of character.”72
According to the character theory of excuse, an excuse will be available to a defendant to
the extent that her action is not a manifestation of her character. The theory proceeds, in Victor
Tadros’ words, “from the principle that, although it is wrongful action that is its primary target,
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criminal liability is justifiable only insofar as the character of the action is an expression of the
character of the agent.”73 While recognizing that the character theory of excuses is hardly
without its critics,74 I would like for the moment to accept its premise as a given, and proceed
from there. In doing so, I rely heavily on Tadros’ account. The claim at present is not that the
“out of character” theory explains all excuse defenses across the board, but rather that it offers a
good explanation for at least particular excuse defenses: involuntary intoxication and (the partial
defense of) provocation. Let us consider each in turn.
Regarding the first, Tadros offers the following hypothetical: D, a devoted husband,
becomes involuntarily intoxicated and while in that state goes through a marriage ceremony with
another woman. He is charged with bigamy. Even in his intoxicated state, D is still able to
reason and control his impulses. But, Tadros says, the “fact that he had become intoxicated put
him in a state where the reasons against marriage, reasons that grounded his devotion as a
husband, did not motivate him where, ordinarily, they would have done.”75 Thus, his denial of
responsibility is based not on the claim that he lacked the capability to be a responsible agent, but
rather on the idea that he was not really himself when he performed the act. And, therefore,
“he,” as a moral actor, should not be held responsible.76
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Such a case, it should be noted, is very different from that in which D voluntarily
becomes intoxicated. The out-of-character theory requires that the defendant bear no
responsibility for being in the condition that made him act like someone other than himself. If D
had voluntarily gotten drunk for the usual reasons that people get drunk – namely, to loose their
inhibitions -- then he should have no claim of excuse.
Now let us consider the “out of character” theory in the context of provocation. Tadros
offers another hypothetical: D is normally a peaceful person. Even when she feels like being
aggressive, she restrains herself because she subscribes to the “guiding reason that one ought not
to use violence on another.”77 But when she is provoked into a state of extreme anger, she is no
longer as responsive to that guiding reason as she normally is. Her character when provoked is
not like her character when calm, and actions done in that state do not reflect as badly on her
settled character as if they had been done while calm. Once again, however, the defense is
available only if D is not responsible for the fact that she was provoked (for example, if she was
short-tempered or went around picking fights).
So what help is all of this to L, our hypothetical looter? Is there some “out of character”
excuse of which he might avail himself? L would argue, first, that at the time of his looting he
was in a state -- of fear, anxiety, peer pressure, and confusion – that caused him, while
committing his act, to have a character that was different from his settled character. It is thus
crucial to L’s defense that he is ordinarily a law-abiding person who respects property rights. (A
career criminal who uses the occasion of a hurricane to loot could not of course argue that his act
was excused, since his act would not be out of character.) Second, L would have to show that the
reason he was in a mental state that caused him to act of character is attributable to factors for

77

Id. at 507.

36

which he is not responsible. Here, the claim would be that L’s relative poverty, the peer pressure
from his neighbors, the lack of police vigilance, and the hurricane-induced inversion of social
order are in fact the kinds of conditions for which L cannot reasonably be said to be responsible.

III. Practical Implications
In the previous Part, I sought to demonstrate the wide array of moral judgments that
attaches to different kinds of looting, ranging from a high level of disapprobation for certain
cases of bad looting, to virtual approval of certain cases of good looting, with many cases in
between. The question now is, how should the criminal justice system treat such a wide range of
conduct? In an attempt to answer this question, this Part addresses three clusters of questions:
(1) How should the responsibility for distinguishing between good, bad, and morally in-between
kinds of looting be apportioned among legislatures, prosecutors, juries, and judges? Should
looting be treated as a separate offense? Should such an offense be divided into different grades,
such as “simple looting” and “aggravated looting”? (2) What factors should these various actors
in the criminal justice system consider in deciding how to grade incidents of looting? What
factors should be viewed as aggravating the seriousness of the defendant’s act. What factors
should be viewed as mitigating? What kinds of defenses, if any, should apply? (3) What should
be the proper law enforcement response to looting? Can there be any justification for a
generalized policy of “shooting looters”?

A. Looting as a Distinct Offense
As noted earlier, only seven U.S. jurisdictions currently have statutes that specifically
make it a crime to engage in looting. In the other states, looting behavior is treated as a form of
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theft or burglary. The question thus arises: is there really any need for a specialized looting
statute, and, if so, what should it look like?
Perhaps the most important principle in determining whether a particular type of criminal
conduct requires its own statutory embodiment is that of fair labeling, the concern of which is, in
Andrew Ashworth’s words, to “see that widely felt distinctions between kinds of offences and
degrees of wrongdoing are respected and signaled by the law, and that offences should be
divided and labeled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude of the law-breaking.”78
The principle is intended to ensure a proportionate response to lawbreaking. “Fairness demands
that offenders be labeled and punished in proportion to their wrongdoing.”79 Such labeling is
important in determining the appropriate punishment, for evaluating prior convictions, and,
perhaps most importantly, in sending the appropriate signal to the public.
If a single criminal label reflects too broad a range of moral content, there is a danger that
less serious incidents of crime will be treated too harshly, and more serious incidents too
leniently. Hence, it is often desirable to refine our offense classifications to make them more
responsive to such concerns. For example, the broadly defined offense of “homicide” has long
since been divided into the more narrowly defined offenses of “murder,” “manslaughter,” and
“negligent homicide.” All three offenses involve essentially the same form of harm (namely, the
death of a human being). But they differ in other significant forms of moral content. Murder is
more serious than involuntary manslaughter because it involves a higher level of mens rea, and is
more serious than voluntary manslaughter because it involves a more serious form of moral
wrongfulness. One can easily imagine a regime in which the legislature created a single
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overarching offense of “homicide,” and in which relatively fine distinctions between murder and
manslaughter were made only at the time of sentencing. But such a regime would be subject to
the complaint that it left too much discretion to the sentencing judge and provided insufficient
notice to potential offenders. In short, murder deserves to be treated separately from
manslaughter because it is morally distinct from manslaughter, and because it would be unfair
and confusing to treat murderers and manslaughters the same.
When new patterns of criminality emerge, or are newly recognized, we often isolate them
by creating new offenses. For example, while the relatively new offense of carjacking could
have been treated as simply another means of committing the previously existing offense of
robbery, many legislatures have thought that a separate offense was called for. A similar pattern
can be observed in the case of fraud (now frequently subdivided into offenses such as bank
fraud, computer fraud, securities fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and accounting fraud).80
The argument for codifying looting separately from burglary and larceny follows a
similar logic. The harms that it causes, the circumstances that give rise to it, the censure that it
elicits, and the potential defenses that it implicates all mark looting out as a distinctive crime.
Moreover, even in terms of its basic elements, looting is distinguishable from burglary
and larceny. Looting has elements that are not a part of burglary or larceny, and larceny and
burglary have elements that are not a part of looting. Like looting (on least in its most common
formulation), burglary requires an unauthorized entry, but, unlike looting, it requires no actual
taking once inside. Larceny, on the other hand, does require a taking, but it does not require an
80
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unauthorized entry. Most importantly, neither burglary nor larceny requires emergency
conditions which lead to the absence of normal security and all of the moral complexity that such
circumstances create, including potentially greater threats to public order and safety, the lack of
sympathy and predatory character of the looter’s acts, and other aggravating and mitigating
factors of the sort that we shall now consider.

B. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Assuming that my argument above is correct, and that a specialized looting statute is
needed to satisfy the principle of fair labeling, the next question is how such a statute should be
formulated and applied. In constructing such a statute, I would begin with a modification of the
basic elements present in current looting statutes. First, I would require that the normal security
of property be absent by virtue of some natural disaster or civil disturbance. Second, for the
reasons discussed above, I would require that the looter steal (as opposed to merely damage) the
property of another. Third, also for the reasons explained above, I would be inclined to eliminate
the requirement that the looter make an unauthorized entry into a home or business, but I would
perhaps leave such entry as an aggravating factor.
The interesting question, though, is what additional elements, if any, such a statute should
include. Should it contain an explicit exception for “necessitous” looting, the way some prison
escape statutes provide an exemption for escapes that involve a “danger to human life.”81 Should
it be divided into grades – say, “aggravated” and “simple,” or “first degree” and “second
degree,” looting? Should it have a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances that would
determine the ultimate range of sentencing?
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One possibility is that the kinds of factual distinctions I am seeking to make between
different kinds of looting are too fine to be written into statutory form and are best left to the
discretion of prosecutors, juries, and sentencing judges. Under this approach, the legislature
would simply lay out the basic elements of the crime and leave the work of making such finer
distinctions to other actors within the criminal justice system.82
To raise this issue is to invite a discussion of difficult and controversial issues concerning
legality, the separation of powers, judicial activism, and the like, most of which lie beyond the
scope of my analysis. (For what it’s worth, my own instinct is that, under the principle of fair
labeling, legislatures have an obligation to distinguish not only between different kinds of
offenses but also between different grades of a given offense and, perhaps, to identify which
defenses, if any, are likely to apply.)
For the moment, my goal is simply to identify those factors that various decision makers
in the criminal justice system – whether legislatures, prosecutors, judges, or juries -- ought to
take into account in distinguishing between more and less blameworthy cases of looting. I divide
them into eleven factors. Factors 1-6 involve primarily the offender’s own circumstances.
Factors 7-11 involve primarily the effects of his acts.
1. Nature of looter’s need. An important factor in determining mitigation and
aggravation is the nature of the looter’s need for the goods stolen. We would want to ask, how
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serious was the emergency in which the looter found himself? How serious was his need to
steal? Would he or someone in his family have starved, or gotten sick, or suffered from
exposure without them? Or was the looter well-supplied and well-provisioned even without his
looting? Could the looter have obtained the stolen goods from other (lawful) sources? Was the
looter employed? Did he have the means to evacuate? How isolated was the looter from relief
teams? How panicked was he? Did the looter have reason to believe that help was on the way?
To the extent that the looter’s needs were shown to be real and urgent, his conduct would be
viewed as less culpable.
2. Nature and quantity of goods taken. A second factor is the nature and quantity of
the goods stolen, damaged, or destroyed. In general, we would view the looting of necessities
like food, basic clothing, and needed prescription medications as less culpable than the looting of
luxury items like DVD players, jewelry, and alcohol (though we should be aware of the
possibility that such luxury goods might in some cases be used a means to barter for necessities).
Even worse would be the looting of guns, narcotics, and other dangerous instrumentalities
(although even here one could imagine a case in which a storm survivor might steal a gun or
other weapon in order to defend himself from intruders). We would also want to know whether
the items, if not taken, would be salvageable after the emergency had passed. For example, other
things being equal, the looting of perishable food items like milk and bread seems less harmful
than the looting of non-perishable items like canned goods and cookware. In addition, we would
want to know the quantity of goods taken or damaged. A looter who took only enough to
survive until the emergency passed would surely be viewed as less culpable than one who took a
larger quantity than he himself could use; a reasonable inference would be that such a person was
taking such goods with the intent to profit from them.
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3. Looter’s willingness to compensate victim for losses. Another question we would
want to ask is whether the looter subsequently expressed his willingness to pay for the goods
taken (assuming he is able to do so), particularly prior to his being arrested and prosecuted. Such
willingness would seem to provide prima facie evidence that the offender did not intend to profit
from his acts and that they were in fact the product of necessity.
4. Looter’s role in group conduct. A fourth factor is whether the looter was acting
alone or in concert with others. Assuming that she was acting with others, we would want to
inquire into her role in the group. Was the looter a ringleader who precipitated a wave of looting
by others, or was she merely a follower who began looting only after others in her community
had already done so? Was the looting done pursuant to an express or implicit agreement, or were
the looters acting out of a spontaneous mob impulse? In general, we would tend to view
collective and premeditated action as more culpable than individual and impulsive action.
5. Role of law enforcement. A fifth factor involves the role of law enforcement. Here,
we would want to ask, did police or other law enforcement officials stand by, acquiescent, while
looting was being perpetrated? To the extent they did, we would want to ask whether the looter
was reasonable in interpreting such conduct as a kind of authorization to engage in such conduct.
We would also want to know if this was a case in which police themselves were participating in
the looting.83 If so, such conduct by police should be treated very harshly.
6. Offender’s criminal history. A court or prosecutor might also want to inquire into
the offender’s criminal history. A looter with a long criminal record of similar acts would
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presumably have a weaker argument that her looting was a one-time, “out of character” deviation
from her usual law-abiding self.
7. Vulnerability of victim. Another important factor in assessing the moral content of
looting would be the vulnerability of the victim. In general, we would expect that the more
serious the disaster or civil disturbance, the more likely that victims would be without normal
security and the more vulnerable they would be.
8. Nature of premises into which entry (if any) is made and from which goods are
taken. An eighth factor in assessing the seriousness of a particular act of looting would be the
nature of the premises, if any, into which the looter made an unauthorized entry and from which
goods were misappropriated. For example, we would want to know if the looter entered a
private home, a local mom-and-pop shop, a government building, or a national chain store.
Presumably, the smaller and more vulnerable the victim, the more significant the harm and the
greater its effect on the local community. One of the concerns here would be with the possibility
that extensive looting might eventually lead to store closings, lost jobs, increased insurance
premiums, and higher prices for residents of the affected community.
9. Nature of violation of property rights. A ninth factor is the kind of property rights
that the looter violates. Most looters carry goods away with the purpose of depriving their owner
of them permanently. In other cases, the looter will destroy or damage goods. In yet other
cases, the looter will merely “borrow” goods. Presumably, borrowing goods without permission
is a less serious violation of property rights than stealing or destroying them.
10. Harm to victim and community generally. Another set of factors we would want
to assess involves the (foreseen or foreseeable) effects of the looter’s acts on his victims and on
the community more generally. We would want to know whether the defendant’s looting posed
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a danger to anyone’s health or safety. Was the owner present when the looting took place? Did
the looter take goods that could not easily be replaced? Were the goods insured against theft or
damage? How disruptive was the looting to the community in which it was perpetrated? How
much did the victim need the goods taken by the looter?
11. Protest movements, food riots, and political transition. Finally, as seen in the
recent case of disaffected youths in France, looting and rioting often accompany protest
movements. Looting has played a particularly particular prominent role in “food riots” in
Argentina, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere, where citizens were protesting increases in food
prices. Looting also sometimes accompanies the transfer of political power, especially in cases
where a despotic regime has suppressed dissent and maintained close control over the
distribution of wealth, as can be seen in connection with the downfall of Saddam Hussein. In
determining whether such surrounding activity should mitigate (or aggravate) the wrongfulness
of looting, we would want to inquire into the merits of the protest. Looting done as part of a
legitimate movement to bring about genuine political reform or liberation should be viewed as
less blameworthy than looting done as part of a scheme to cause chaos or oppression, although,
admittedly, determining which kind of protest is which is likely to be the subject of
controversy.84
In sum, where the mitigating circumstances of the defendant’s acts are compelling (e.g.,
the emergency was serious, the offender stole only enough goods to survive and such goods were
in any event perishable, and where he was one of the last to participate in the looting), the statute
should provide a complete defense. On the other hand, where the aggravating circumstances
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were serious (e.g., the offender took large quantities of luxury goods which he intended to sell
for a profit, and he was one of the first to loot), the penalties should be more severe than in the
case of simple larceny or burglary. Those acts that lie somewhere in between should be subject
to relatively light penalties.

C. Law Enforcement Response: “Shooting Looters”
Even before a suspected looter comes into contact with prosecutors, judges, and juries, he
will likely encounter the police. A final issue that needs to be considered, then, is the appropriate
law enforcement response to acts of looting at the scene of the crime. Although the moral
content of the looter’s act is not relevant here in quite the direct way it is in determining whether
and how the act should be treated by prosecutors, judges, and juries, it will nevertheless
constitute a relevant consideration in determining the appropriate police response.
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, various “conservative” media commentators, including
Peggy Noonan (writing on the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal), suggested that the most
appropriate response to looters is to shoot them on sight.85 Sometimes the suggestion was that
such shootings be done by the police.86 Other times, it was suggested that looters be shot by
private citizens.87 Even more striking, there is evidence that the shooting of looters was for a

85

Noonan, supra note 8.

86

Mona Charen, Shoot Looters, TOWNHALL.COM (Sept. 2, 2005),
<http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/monacharen/2005/09/02/155214.html> (“If police officers are
authorized to shoot looters, this intelligence will spread quickly among the criminal population. The free-for-all will
come to an abrupt end.”).
87

David Kopel, Armed Response to Looters, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY,
<http//volokh.com/posts/chain_1125597101.shtml> “Given the absence of a sufficient police presence in order to
stop the looters, I strongly agree . . . that such looters should be shot on sight by armed citizens.”).

46

time the accepted policy of U.S. occupation forces in Iraq.88 In this final section, I want to
examine the arguments, such as they are, for and against a policy that would authorize such
shooting of looters.
We begin with the rule, pervasive at least in Anglo-American jurisprudence, that deadly
force may not be used in defense of property, even when it is the only means available to prevent
the loss.89 This rule is consistent with the more general rule that defensive force must be
proportional – i.e., not excessive in relation -- to the harm threatened. Naturally, where the
looting of property is combined with behavior that involves an imminent and deadly threat to a
person, there is no question that deadly force would be allowed. But our focus here is on what
we might call “pure looting,” in which the only threat is to property. The question is whether
there is something special about the threat posed by looting that would distinguish it from the
threat posed by other property crimes, such as burglary and theft, and thereby justify the use of
deadly force.
At first glance, it might seem as if the use of deadly force in response to looting could be
justified along lines similar to those that have been used to justify the use of deadly force in
88

On May 14, 2003, the New York Times reported on a “tough new security setup” in Iraq under the then-new
American Administrator L. Paul Bremer. The Times quoted an unnamed American official describing a meeting he
had attended at which Bremer laid out the new policy. The official told the Times, “I think you are going to see a
change in the rules of engagement within a few days to get the situation under control.” Asked what this meant, the
official replied, “They are going to start shooting a few looters so that the word gets around” that assaults on
property . . . will be dealt with using deadly force.” Tyler, supra note 9, at A1. Two days later, the Times quoted
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld describing as “hyperbole” the May 14 article reporting that American forces
would have the authority to shoot looters on sight. Rumsfeld was quoted as saying, “[w]e have rules of engagement
– have had, do today. They’ve not been changed. [Those rules] permit ‘the use of whatever force is necessary for
self-defense or for other selected purposes.’” Patrick E. Tyler, Aftereffects: Law and Order; American Troops Step
Up Efforts to Curb Crime and in Iraqi Capital, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2003), at A16. Whether such “other selected
purposes” include the shooting of looters who threaten property alone remains unclear. In any event, shooting
looters in Iraq was clearly the approach recommended by Fox News commentator Bill O’Reilly. See Bill O’Reilly,
Shoot to Kill, FOX NEWS.COM, http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,86967,00.html (“[I] urge the
Pentagon to stop the P.R. dance and impose strict rules of conduct for the Iraqi people to follow. . . . Shoot looters
to kill, and aim well.”).
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defense of dwellings, a topic that I have dealt with in detail elsewhere.90 But even if the use of
deadly force in such circumstances could be justified (a proposition about which I have
previously expressed a good deal of skepticism91), the rationale that underlies such use of force
would not apply to the typical case of looting. The defense of premises doctrine is based on a
series of assumptions about the special dangers and interests and vulnerabilities that supposedly
(and, in my view, questionably) attend unlawful entry when the homeowner/defender is present
in the home being invaded.
Thus, there are at least three reasons why a defense-of-premises-type rationale would not
apply to the vast majority of looting cases. First, looting rarely occurs when the home or
business owner is present in the premises being invaded.92 Second, the kind of “looter shooting”
that commentators such as Noonan have in mind seems unlikely to occur inside premises,
whether or not occupied. The kind of action that seems to be contemplated involves suspected
looters who are running down the street, carrying allegedly stolen goods, in the open. Finally,
the defense of premises doctrine usually requires that the defender warn the intruder to desist
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(and that the intruder fail to do so) before deadly force can be used.93 The suggestion that looters
be shot “on sight” obviously implies that no such warning would be given.
The question, then, comes down to this: Is there something about “looting” property, as
opposed to merely “stealing” it, that would justify a departure from the traditional rule against
using deadly force in defense of property? If my argument in Part II is correct, looting (or at
least “bad looting”) should indeed be viewed as a more serious crime than ordinary theft or
burglary. It involves a kind of exploitative and predatory behavior that is significantly more
blameworthy than these other offenses. And the harms it causes go well beyond the loss of
property or invasion of property involved in “routine” theft and burglary. As I argued above,
looting is as much a crime against public order as it against property. It is both a cause and a
consequence of anarchy. More than almost any other crime, looting reflects a breakdown in
social norms. It should, as I suggested, be punished severely.
But to recognize all this is a far cry from saying that the routine shooting of looters would
be justified. The fact is that punishment and law enforcement are two very different kinds of
institutions.94 Punishment in our system is imposed only after the defendant has been convicted
by a unanimous jury based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Law enforcement, by contrast,
is carried out in the heat of the moment, often by a single official, based on incomplete
information. Neither police nor civilians are empowered to use force to punish; they are
authorized to use such force only to protect public safety, apprehend suspects, and conduct
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investigations. Where looting is aimed solely at property, and involves no specific threat of
harm to any person, there is simply no rationale for responding with deadly force.95
There is a real danger that an overaggressive police response to looting will result in
overdeterrence. Persons who genuinely qualify for the necessity defense might forgo the
opportunity to engage in justified looting if they believe there is a good chance that they will be
gunned down in the process. As illustrated by the two photos with which this article began,
distinguishing between good and bad looting on the basis of superficial appearances can be
difficult. Even if the looter is observed carrying away luxury items such as jewelry or electronic
equipment, it cannot necessarily be assumed that his looting is bad: He might well plan to barter
such items for basic necessities such as food and medicine.
Moreover, racial prejudice plays a particularly problematic role. It seems obvious that
young African-American males are more likely than whites to be mistakenly suspected of bad
looting, and they are therefore also more likely to be mistakenly shot by overzealous law
enforcement officials. As in the case of wrongful executions, wrongful killings by police (and
civilians) are irreversible. Deadly force should never be used to stop looters who threaten
nothing more than property.

Conclusion
The concept of looting encompasses a remarkably broad range of behaviors, possibly
unique in all the criminal law. At its most reprehensible, looting is predatory, merciless, and
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productive of anarchy. At its most forgivable, it offers an accepted means of survival in
emergency circumstances. In between are instances of looting which, if not justifiable, may be at
least partially excusable. Current law does a poor job of accommodating such moral complexity.
Looting is ordinarily treated as just another form of burglary or theft, the necessity defense is
construed extremely narrowly, and in the handful of states that do make looting a distinct crime,
the statutes offer no real basis for distinguishing the bad from the good.
Sadly, in a world plagued by increasing inequalities in wealth, terrorism, and globalwarming-induced weather disasters, looting is a phenomenon that is likely to be with us for some
time. Some commentators have reacted with inflammatory calls to “shoot looters on sight.” The
framework developed here offers the basis for what I believe is a far more rational approach to
the problem.
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